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Abstract 
The Automatic Identification System (AIS), a ship reporting system originally designed for collision 
avoidance, is becoming a cornerstone of maritime situational awareness. The recent increase of terrestrial 
networks and satellite constellations of receivers is providing global tracking data that enable a wide 
spectrum of applications beyond collision avoidance. Nevertheless, AIS suffers the lack of security measures 
that makes it prone to receiving positions that are unintentionally incorrect, jammed or deliberately falsified. 
In this work we analyse a solution to the problem of AIS data verification that can be implemented within a 
generic networks of ground AIS base stations with no need for additional sensors or technologies.  
The proposed approach combines a classic radio-localisation method based on Time Difference of Arrival 
(TDoA) with an Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) designed to track vessels in geodetic coordinates. 
The approach is validated using anonymised real AIS data collected by multiple base stations that partly 
share coverage areas. The results show a deviation between the estimated origin of detected signals and the 
broadcast position data in the order of hundreds of meters, therefore demonstrating the operational potential 
of the methodology. 
1. Introduction1 
The verification of the trustworthiness of Automatic Identification System (AIS) data is becoming a key 
problem to exploit the full potential of this technology not only for safety but also for security applications. 
AIS, originally conceived for collision avoidance, is a system whereby ships broadcast their presence, 
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identification and location. Differently to other operational coastal active systems for maritime surveillance, 
AIS is characterised by considerable coverage (VHF propagation) together with a relatively accurate 
positioning (GNSS) performance [1]. Nevertheless, the cooperative nature of AIS and the lack of intrinsic 
security make it vulnerable to false or missing declarations.  
Ships of 300 gross tons and upwards in international voyages, 500 tons and upwards for cargoes not in 
international waters and passenger vessels are obliged to be fitted with AIS equipment as regulated by the 
IMO Safety of life and sea (SOLAS) [2]. Furthermore, all EU fishing vessels of overall length exceeding 15 
metres are also required to be fitted with AIS from May 2014 [3].  
AIS reports encode state vector information such as latitude, longitude, Speed Over Ground (SOG), Course 
Over Ground (COG) as derived by the on board GNSS receiver. Such information is broadcast at a variable 
transmission rate depending on the vessel motion: as an example, the rate is increased up to a message every 
two seconds when the vessel is sailing at high speed or manoeuvring. In addition, every six minutes, vessels 
transmit their identification (IMO and MMSI number, ship name and call sign), static (size, type of vessel, 
type of cargo, etc.) and voyage related information (e.g. Estimated Time of Arrival and destination).  Such 
information is manually set and therefore not fully reliable since more subject to errors if compared to 
positioning data [4].  
With the advent of networked regional base stations (e.g. the European SafeSeaNet or the Mediterranean AIS 
Regional Exchange  System - MAREΣ), and satellite receiver constellations [5], the system progressively 
proved effective for maritime surveillance and traffic monitoring, enabling far-reaching applications such as 
traffic knowledge discovery, route prediction and anomaly detection. The latter can target particular low-
likelihood motion trajectories ([6],[7]), alerts such as sailing in restricted areas, abrupt changes of direction 
(an extensive overview of this rules is presented in [8]) or anomalies related to wrong AIS message 
information either unintentional or deliberate such as spoofing. As an example, false GNSS tracking 
information can be produced to simulate specific trajectories [9] or false AIS messages can be generated and 
transmitted at VHF as recently demonstrated in [10]. Such events, besides being potentially serious hazards 
to the safety of navigation especially in reduced visibility conditions, can also represent security threats by 
covering unauthorised activities at sea such as illegal movements of goods and people.  
The detection of position reporting anomalies either linked to AIS transponder failures or due to deliberately 
falsified broadcast dynamic information, can be approached in different ways. The correlation with 
additional sensors can be used to detect AIS data spoofing; such sensors could be coastal radars (see e.g. 
[11]), HF Surface Wave Radars [12] or space based Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) [13]. Nevertheless, the 
operational usability of such approaches depends on the availability and persistency of the data provided by 
such additional sensors. Similar considerations apply to data correlation using secondary reporting systems 
such as Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT). Other approaches aim at increasing the 
trustworthiness of the transponder through the use of additional on-board instrumentation as investigated by 
[14].  
In this work we consider a methodology that can be easily applied to the existing AIS network using the 
messages normally provided by the AIS base stations. The idea is to combine Time of Arrival (ToA) 
measurements from multiple AIS channels to determine Time Difference of Arrival (TDoA) measurements. 
Then TDoAs are processed using a classic multilateration procedure [15] to estimate the vessel position with 
uncertainty at each time instant [16]. Similar approaches based on multilateration (MLAT) and wide area 
MLAT (WAMT) techniques have been widely used for air traffic surveillance using secondary surveillance 
radar (SSR) Mode S replies (e.g. [17]) leading to location errors in the order of a few metres (see e.g. [18]). 
Differently from such applications, the localisation accuracy that can be achieved using AIS messages is 
significantly poor as the Cramer-Rao Lower Bound of the ToA estimate using such transmissions is limited 
by a signal bandwidth that is less than 25 kHz. This is further analysed in the following Sections. Moreover, 
being the proposed approach leveraging existing systems, the receiving base stations are separated by 
baselines of tens or even hundreds of kilometres, their number is critically limited to a few units and in 
principle ad hoc deployments are not envisaged. Finally, the VHF radio propagation is often characterised by 
ducting effects that help in extending the AIS reception far beyond the line-of-sight, but also lead to 
additional uncertainty on the relationship between the message time of flight and the actual emission 
location. All the above make multilateration in this context not sufficient to guarantee anti-spoofing 
operational requirements in terms of location accuracy and coverage areas. As a consequence, a further AIS 
emission tracking stage is needed after classic multilateration approaches, whereby radiolocation accuracy is 
improved through time integration by means of an Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) in geodetic coordinates. 
This is made possible in the maritime domain as a consequence the relatively slow and predictable 
manoeuvres of ships with respect to the AIS messages refresh rates. 
The paper aims at demonstrating the feasibility of radiolocation of AIS emissions as the basis for future anti-
spoofing and AIS verification applications based on anomaly detection techniques. 
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we briefly describe the Italian AIS Network; in Section 3 we 
introduce the models for ToA and TDoA measurements, and discuss the effects of noise with a specific 
attention towards bias compensation. In Section 4 we define the TDoA based multilateration procedure and 
discuss some localisation results for different AIS network configurations. The EKF for time integration in 
geodetic coordinates is discussed in Section 5 along with the tracking results from processing real AIS data 
collected by the Italian AIS network. Finally, conclusions and future directions are discussed in Section 6. 
2. The Italian AIS Terrestrial Network 
Implemented in 2005 to fulfil the requirements of the Directive 2002/59/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 27 June 2002, the Italian AIS network has been completely upgraded in 2012-2103, with 
the aim to comply with the most recent relevant guidelines and recommendations, such as the IALA 
Recommendation A 124 on “The AIS Service” (December 2012) and the ITU Recommendation ITU-R 
M.1371-4 issued on April 2010. The network currently consists of 60 base stations mainly located to get the 
best VHF coverage (up to 100 nautical miles, even without the duct effect).   
The base stations were placed in such a way to get an overlap of the radio coverage (Figure 1) in order to: i) 
increase the overall availability of the services provided by the national AIS network ii) enable future 
adoption of anti-spoofing techniques to improve quality of AIS information received.  The overall 
architecture of the Italian AIS network is shown in Figure 2. One of the key elements of the network is the so 
called AIS Embedded Server, a fully solid-state device featuring two separate servers thus supporting 
redundancy or the simultaneous interface to two TCP networks. The AIS Embedded Server, acting as a PSS 
Controlling Unit (PCU) according to the IALA Recommendation A-124, allows the integration of one or 
more base stations and their management from shore systems. The Embedded Server can acquire AIS data 
from the serial ports and from TCP connections according to the specified configuration. 
 Figure 1:  AIS Coverage Overlapping 
 
In the same way, the collected AIS data are made available to serial ports and TCP connections. It also 
features an embedded interface for each web server which allows configuring and monitoring for both the 
servers and the connected AIS Base Station, without using any additional software. Authorized operators can 
log-in on the web interface to configure and monitor every aspect of the server, its ports and connections and 
the linked devices and users. 
 
 
Figure 2: The Italian AIS Network architecture 
 
The AIS system dynamically configures into cells using a Self-Organised Time Division Multiple Access 
(SO-TDMA) scheme. The cell size is adjusted to adapt as a function of the traffic density: in highly 
congested areas for instance, it is necessary to reduce the size of the cell to diminish the number of 
transmitter in the cell; this is achieved by reducing the power of the AIS transponders from 12.5 W (‘high 
setting’) to 1W (‘low setting’) thus avoiding message collisions [19]. AIS data are transmitted at a rate of 9.6 
kb/s using Gaussian minimum shift keying (GMSK) modulation over two channels 161.975 MHz and 
162.025 MHz. For each channel, 2250 slots are allocated within a timeframe of 60 seconds, starting every 
minute. The bandwidth of the channels is nominally 25 kHz, although the AIS signal spectrum has to be 
within an emission mask defined by -25 dBc at +10kHz and -70 dBc+25 kHz [19]. Moreover, transmissions 
of AIS devices are synchronized by using a common time reference, UTC (Coordinated Universal Time), 
provided by the internal GNSS receiver. Transmission timing error including jitter and systematic offsets 
should be within ± 104 µs of the synchronisation source for mobile stations and ± 52 µs for base stations, 
setting the limits of the accuracy of time of flight estimation. If the internal GNSS receiver is faulty, the AIS 
devices are capable of synchronizing to secondary timing sources as the received AIS messages; in this case, 
the timing error may increase up to 312 µs.  Anyway, AIS stations are not allowed to discard received 
messages basing upon timing error, even when it is much bigger than the above specified values. 
3. ToA and TDoA Measurements 
In this section we discuss the models used to describe ToA and TDoA measurements available from the 
Italian AIS Network.  Specific attention is devoted to the analysis of the noise distributions in order to verify 
stationary and Gaussian assumptions and obtain reasonable estimates for bias compensation. 
The standard for AIS base stations provides for a sentence containing information associated to the time of 
arrival of received messages, expanding the set of messages defined in the NMEA standard [20]. The specific 
field in the sentence allows representing a precision up to 1 ns, however a precision of 1 µs is currently 
obtained for the Italian Coast Guard National AIS network. Such precision is sufficient to estimate the 
location of the emission using multilateration and triangulation techniques as further discussed in this work. 
The time of arrival is estimated by detecting the position of a specific marker in the AIS message, the start 
flag, relative to the slot start. The measurement is impacted by the timing error of the receiving station and 
by the quality of received signal. Low SNR may affect the accuracy of symbol clock recovery performed by 
the GMSK demodulator, which is currently limited by a resolution of 10.4 µs set by the internal sampling 
rate. Eventually, the accuracy of time of arrival may be greatly enhanced by base stations specifically 
designed to address this issue.    
The Time of Flight (ToF) of the electromagnetic wave carrying the AIS message can be calculated as the 
difference between the Time of Arrival (ToA) and the beginning of the time slot (Tslot) during which the 
message has been transmitted, i.e.: 
(1) rxtxslotTToAToF ηη −−−=  
where ηtx and ηrx are the transmitter and receiver timing errors, respectively. When it is possible to fully 
characterise the errors ηtx and ηrx, an unbiased estimate of the ToF could be obtained and used to derive 
distance R from the considered vessel and the receiving AIS Base Station (AIS-BS), i.e. R=c ToF where c is 
the speed of light.  Multiple distances from different AIS-BSs could then be used to find an unbiased 
estimate of the instantaneous vessel position using ToA based triangulation.  
Unfortunately the transmitter timing error ηtx is generally unknown and, as mentioned before, can be in the 
order of tens of µs leading to large ranging uncertainties. Moreover, ηtx is vessel-dependent due to differences 
in the electronics of different transmission equipment. This means that a full characterisation of ηtx is not 
possible and the ToA measurements cannot be robustly used to directly solve the vessel localisation problem. 
The simplest idea in this case is to compare the received ToAs pairwise and use the Time Difference of 
Arrivals (TDOAs). Hence, assume the vessel under surveillance is within the coverage area of n AIS-BSs, 
then it is possible to collect 
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As for the parameters ),( ii σµ some a priori knowledge might be available from the receivers’ 
characteristics. Since this is not our case, an estimate of ),( TDoATDoA Rµ can be obtained using batch data or 
over a moving time-window. In addition, if ToA measurements are optimally obtained using correlation 
processing, the standard deviations iσ can be modelled using the Cramer-Rao Lower Bound [21]: 
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where B is the signal bandwidth and SNRi is the Signal-to-Noise ratio of the i-th channel. SNRi could be 
modelled by means of Friis transmission equation as )( kii xSNRSNR
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∧
 is the estimated vessel 
position at time k.  
A noise analysis was performed using real AIS data collected for approximately 9 hours over 3 days. Results 
are depicted in Figure 3 for a subset of the Italian AIS Network. Both AIS service messages (i.e. base station 
reports periodically transmitted [10]) and AIS messages from verified vessel trajectories were used to 
estimate the noise distribution.  
 
Figure 3: Probability density function of the TDoA errors for a set of receiving station pairs. The relevant 
bias µi - µj  (highlighted in red) can be readily estimated. Notice also that an upper bound of ±13.5 µs 
(highlighted in orange) can be selected so that about 95% of noise pdf is included. 
 
From the results in Figure 3, it is immediate to verify the assumed Gaussian properties and extract reasonable 
estimates for each bias ji µµ − and variance 22 ji σσ + . Finally, since the bias TDoAµ  appears to be sufficiently 
stationary we can use the estimate TDoAµˆ  for bias compensation. 
4. TDOA-based Vessel Localisation  
The problem of estimating an emitter position from TDoA measurements occurs in a wide range of 
applications. Conceptually, a correlation analysis of the received signal from two receivers should give rise 
to one hyperbolic function. However, due to TDoA measurement uncertainty, it is not possible to use multiple 
hyperbolas to robustly determine a unique intersection [16]. We in fact face a nonlinear estimation problem 
defined as follows. Assume that a vessel transmitting AIS messages is located at position ( )vvv yxP ,= . Let 
( )yxP ,=  be a generic point in geodetic coordinates and let ( )RXiRXiRXi yxP ,=  be the position vector for the i-
th AIS base station. Then a nonlinear estimate of vP is found as: 
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and ( )⋅d  is a suitable distance. This could be for instance the square of the Euclidean distance (i.e. least 
squares estimate) or the Mahalanobis distance (i.e. maximum likelihood estimate). 
Since we are instead interested in finding the associated estimation error we can use the following approach. 
Consider for instance a fixed grid of points P in geodetic coordinates, and set an upper bound on the 
differential time uncertainty as sK µ5.13= , which corresponds to about 4 km location uncertainty. This 
bound was chosen so that 95% of the noise probability density function (pdf) is covered (see Figure 3). Then 
we can easily identify the set of points P that satisfy the following set of inequalities, i.e. 
(12) ( ) nijKcTDoAPPPh jiRXjRXi ≤<≤⋅≤− 1,,, ,  
The locus of points where (12) is verified is a hyperbola with uncertainty in the flat-earth approximation case 
[16]. The area contained by all intersections can be thought of as a measure of the estimation error. Examples 
of this are shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5 where the AIS message emission is located within the intersection 
of the hyperbolic functions as derived from the TDoA measurements between three and four stations 
respectively. 
Then assuming a Gaussian distribution for the noise terms (as verified in the previous section), the associated 
estimation covariance is given by the minimum volume ellipse enclosing all points that verified (12). 
A more rigorous approach uses the Mahalanobis distance: 
(13) 
( )
[ ]
T
MTDoAM
P
v
M
nn
M
M
ji
RX
j
RX
i
M
ji
RP
dd
TDoAPPPhd
∆∆=
=∆
−=
−
−
1
1,1,2
,,
ˆminargˆ
,,
L  
where vPˆ is the maximum likelihood estimate and TDoARˆ  is an estimate of the TDoA covariance given in (6). 
In this case the error area is given by the set of points that verify the following Chi-Square test: 
(14) ( )KR TMTDoAM ,ˆ 1 αγ≤∆∆ −  
where ( )K,αγ is the value of the Chi-Square distribution for K degrees of freedom and α−1  confidence. 
Notice that for both problems in (10) and (13) we are assuming either zero TDoA bias, i.e., 10KxTDoA =µ or 
that a reasonable estimate TDoAµˆ  is available for bias compensation. This is possible in our case since the 
time error bias at the receiver is sufficiently stationary in time and space (Section 3).  The output of the 
TDoA-based localisation procedure is a pair (zk, Rk). Specifically, zk containing the vessel location estimate in 
geodetic coordinates and Rk is a covariance matrix describing the minimum volume ellipse enclosing the set 
of points that verify eq. (14). Time integration is then performed by using (zk, Rk) as inputs of a suitable 
Extended Kalman Filter as described in the following section.  
 
 Figure 4: Radiolocation of the AIS emission in the Ligurian Sea as the intersection of the TDoAs hyperbolic 
functions between three receiving stations (red circles on land). The AIS encoded position (blue circle) falls 
within the estimated emission area (red).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: The AIS emission is received by four stations (red circles). The additional AIS base station yields a 
reduction of the intersection area between the available TDoAs, thus reducing the localisation uncertainty.  
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Figure 7: The radiolocation uncertainty changes depending on the position of the emission and the 
receivers’ location.  
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Figure 6: The radiolocation results highlight that the message originally transmitted in open seas 
(blue circle) is repeated by the base station in Genoa. 
Another localisation example is reported in Figure 6. Here the AIS-based radiolocation and the declared 
vessel position are sensibly different: this happens when the AIS message from the vessel in open seas (blue 
circle) is repeated by a base station2, easily located in Genoa in this case. 
 
 
Figure 8: Radiolocation uncertainty limits obtained when a single AIS message is received from different 
base stations (purple) using three TDoA measurements (a,b and c) and considering K = 13.5 µs  for each 
TDoA. Resulting performance when the message is received by four base stations, leading to six TDoAs (d).  
 
The spatial distribution of base stations is central to the performance of the radiolocation process. This is 
given by the extent of the uncertainty at a specific location in space and varies depending on the transmitter 
position with respect to the receiving stations. For instance, in Figure 7 the message is received by three 
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 In accordance with AIS standard, a base station can be required to store and forward a position message 
sent by a vessel. 
stations and the emission location can be verified. However, the error area is quite large. This happens 
because the vessel is far away from all the sensors baselines and the angles of arrivals are similar. To better 
clarify this point we performed a geometric analysis of the localisation precision with reference to the 
positions of the Italian Base Stations. Results are given in Figure 8, where we show how the estimated 
precision varies in space for different AIS network configurations. 
5. Vessel Tracking using an Extended Kalman Filter 
As previously mentioned, at time step k the multilateration procedure gives as output a pair (zk, Rk) for each 
vessel, where zk is the estimated vessel position and Rk its associated error covariance. We can then perform 
model-based time integration by recursively solving the Chapman-Kolmogorov integral and Bayes equation 
[22]. In fact, Bayesian methods provide a rigorous framework for dynamic state estimation problems. The 
idea is to construct the pdf of the system state based on all the available information, and then find an 
approximation of such a posteriori pdf. Classical inference methods for nonlinear filtering are the Extended 
Kalman Filter (EKF) [23], based on linearisation of the system about the current state estimate, and the 
Unscented Kalman Filter (UKF) [24], based on a deterministic sampling of the a posteriori pdf. Improved 
tracking accuracy can be generally achieved by means of Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC) methods like the 
Particle Filter (PF) [25]. 
 
For our specific problem we can use a nonlinear equation to efficiently describe the vessel trajectory. In fact, 
let xk , yk, vk, and ck be the Latitude, Longitude, Speed Over Ground (SOG), and Course Over Ground (COG) 
at time k. Then the geodetic vessel position at time k+1 is given by: 
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where Rearth is the Earth radius and Tk is the sampling interval of the filtering problem, i.e. the time interval 
between two consecutive (lat,lon) estimates from the multilateration procedure. As for the SOG vk and COG 
ck, we assume zero-dynamic with Gaussian noise. Then by choosing xk = [xk  yk  vk  ck]T as the system state, we 
can describe our problem using the following dynamic system with nonlinear dynamics and linear 
measurement equation, i.e. 
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where ),0(~ kk QNw  and ),0(~ kk RNv  are zero-mean white Gaussians representing the process and 
measurement noise, respectively.  Given the initial state estimate x0 and associated error covariance P0, the 
EKF for the system in eqs. (15)-(18) is given by the following two step recursion: 
Prediction Step 
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Update Step 
(22) kTkkkkk RHPHS += −1|  
(23) 11| −−= kTkkkk SHPK  
(24) ( )1|1|| ˆˆˆ −− −+= kkkkkkkkk HK xzxx  
(20) ( ) 1|| −× −= kkkknnkk PHKIP  
where 1−kF  in eq. (20) is the Jacobian of the nonlinear time evolution ( )⋅f , and ( )kkkk P || ,xˆ  are the state 
estimate and associated error covariance at time k. 
Tracking Results 
We now report the tracking results obtained from processing real AIS data collected by the Italian Terrestrial 
Network for approximately 3 hours. Results for a single vessel are depicted in Figures 9 to 11.  
 
Figure 9: Tracking results for a single vessel leaving the port of Savona (left) and zoomed trajectory. True 
trajectory (green), estimates from the multilateration procedure (black), and EKF position estimates (red). 
 
 
Figure 10: Localisation error over time for a single vessel trajectory: Multilateration procedure (blue) and 
EKF in geodetic coordinates (red). 
Specifically, in Figure 9 we report the reference vessel trajectory (green) from GNSS data, the (lat, lon) 
estimates from the localisation procedure (black crosses), and the EKF position estimates (red circles). 
Notice that we report the reference vessel location only when the AIS message is received by at least 3 AIS 
base stations. This is done in order to highlight the gaps of TDoA measurements due to non-perfect coverage. 
The estimation errors over time for the TDoA localisation and after EKF processing are depicted in Figure 
10.  Finally, the EKF results in estimating the vessel kinematics, i.e. SOG and COG, are depicted in Figure 
11.  
 
Figure 11: EKF results in estimating the vessel kinematics. True and estimated Speed Over Ground (left); 
true and estimated Course Over Ground (right). 
 
We performed the same tracking analysis for all the vessel trajectories within the coverage of at least 3 AIS 
base stations. Results for a vessel leaving the port of La Spezia are depicted in Figures 12 to 14. Specifically, 
the (lat, lon) tracking results are depicted in Figure 12, the estimation errors are reported in Figure 13, and 
the EKF results in estimating the vessel COG and SOG are depicted in Figure 14. Significant differences in 
terms of multilateration position error can be seen from Figure 13 if compared with Figure 10 for a vessel 
leaving the port of Savona. This is due to better coverage in the area of La Spezia, i.e. there are 4 AIS base 
stations available most of the time, as predicted by the static analysis reported in Figure 8. The same metrics 
are depicted for a third vessel trajectory in Figures 15 to 17. From the results we can verify that the average 
location error of the EKF is always below 2km, thus confirming the effectiveness of the radiolocation 
technique.  
 
Figure 12: Tracking results for a single vessel leaving the port of La Spezia (left) and zoomed trajectory. 
True trajectory (green), estimates from the multilateration procedure (black), and EKF position estimates 
(red). 
 
 
Figure 13: Localisation error over time for a single vessel trajectory: Multilateration procedure (blue) and 
EKF in geodetic coordinates (red). 
 Figure 14: EKF results in estimating the vessel kinematics. True and estimated Speed Over Ground (left); 
true and estimated Course Over Ground (right). 
 
It is worth noting that the number of scans needed by the EKF to converge to the true COG and SOG values 
sensibly varies from track to track. This is due to a number of factors, chief amongst them the positions of 
the transmitter and the receivers, the motion and velocity of the vessel and the variable time between scans. 
The latter depends on i) the AIS transmission rate, which changes according to the vessel manoeuvre and 
velocity and ii) the rate of reception of the message by three or more stations.   
 
Figure 15: Tracking results for a single vessel travelling westbound. True trajectory (green), estimates from 
the multilateration procedure (black), and EKF position estimates (red). 
 
Additional tuning of the filter parameters could lead to improved performance in terms of the estimated COG 
and SOG. In general reducing the filter process noise leads to more precise estimates for the vessel 
kinematics. This however might reduce the filter robustness and precision in terms of location estimates.  
 
Figure 16: Localisation error over time for a single vessel trajectory: Multilateration procedure (blue) and 
EKF in geodetic coordinates (red). 
 
 
Figure 17: EKF results in estimating the vessel kinematics. True and estimated Speed Over Ground (left); 
true and estimated Course Over Ground (right). 
 
Finally, collective results are depicted in Figure 18 where we report the tracking results for all considered 
vessel trajectories in the north Tyrrhenian. Specifically, we report the true vessel trajectory (green), the 
estimates from the multilateration procedure (black), and the EKF position estimates (red). As previously 
mentioned, we consider only the vessel trajectories within the coverage area of at least 3 AIS base station. 
 
Figure 18: Tracking results for a set of trajectories using real AIS data collected by the Italian Terrestrial 
Network over about 3 hours and received by 3 or more stations. It is worth noting that AIS tracks received by 
less than 3 stations are not plotted. 
 
Two final remarks on the results in Figure 18: (1) some of the estimates from the multilateration procedure 
are on land; this is due to the fact that the multilateration procedure is performed without applying land 
constraints to avoid biasing the EKF measurements. However, Bayes optimal methods to enforce such 
constraints exist [26] and will be used in future developments. (2) Some of the initial/final estimates from the 
multilateration procedure are far away from the true vessel location (blue highlight in the figure): this 
happens when there is a non-optimal spatial distribution of the AIS base stations, leading to multiple 
solutions (ghost estimates) to the TDoA localisation problem. This problem could be solved by extending the 
overlapping coverage of the AIS network and/or by using a Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC) filter, e.g. the 
Particle Filter, to keep track of the intrinsically multimodal posterior pdf. We will in fact consider the use of 
Particle Filtering for future research since it should lead to more robust results for decision making. 
The demonstrated average performance of the proposed radiolocation and tracking technique based on EKF 
confirms that the approach could be used to perform automatic validation of declared GNSS positions 
encoded in the broadcast AIS messages. This could be performed using a single step gate validation [27] or a 
more effective binary hypothesis testing over a moving time window [28].  The former approach may be 
sufficient if the EKF estimate is close to the true vessel position but is intrinsically prone to a large number 
of false positives. A more effective way of performing data validation is the use of a binary hypothesis test 
where  is the hypothesis for no anomaly and  the hypothesis for ongoing anomaly. Given the random 
variable Z representing the multilateration output and z its realization, the binary hypothesis test is performed 
by comparing the likelihood ratio |	
| |	
|⁄  against a decision threshold defined by the prior 
and Bayes risk [28]. In particular, the |	
| represents the likelihood of observing z given the vessel is 
located in the GNSS declared position, and |	
| is the likelihood of observing z given the vessel is 
following the EKF estimated track. Both the single step validation gate and the binary hypothesis test should 
be applied only when the multilateration confidence is high (see Figure 8) in order to minimise the anomaly 
false alarm rate. These aspects will be the subject of future research activities. 
6. Conclusions 
A number of activities (traffic monitoring & management, Search & Rescue, etc.) at sea are based upon 
information provided by vessels through AIS. AIS communication system is prone to tampering and 
spoofing, thus the validation of the data provided through a reporting system such as AIS is an important 
issue faced by authorities involved in the different areas of maritime surveillance. It is not known the level of 
actual alteration of AIS provided data which, nevertheless, is expected to increase in the future. Therefore, it 
is important to improve the assessment of the reliability of the position data transmitted by ships in an 
automated way to increase the safety of the seas. This paper has successfully addressed this issue offering an 
effective method to validate the position data sent by the ships through AIS, with an accuracy that ranges 
from few hundreds of metres, in optimal condition, to few kilometres in marginal situation. It has to be noted 
that from the operational point of view such accuracy can be considered more than acceptable. The proposed 
method collects the data provided by the network of stations receiving the AIS messages transmitted by the 
ship at seas and uses the Time Stamp (Time of Arrival) added by the AIS base stations to the messages 
received from the ship. The algorithm allows, in few steps, to narrow down the estimated position of the ship 
to few hundreds of metres (without using in any way the position reported by the ship). The algorithm 
described in the paper has been successfully tested using real, anonymised data provided by the Italian Coast 
Guard, demonstrating that EKF outperforms multilateration for maritime situational awareness. Moreover, 
the tracks originated by the proposed methodology can be thought of as the input of automatic tools for the 
detection of anomalies related to AIS data verification, which represent the next stage of this research 
activity. 
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